Abstract-A key challenge in operating cognitive radios (CRs) without disturbing PR transmissions. A typical measure of in a self-organizing (ad hoc) network is how to adaptively and efficiency is the achievable sum-rate of all CR pairs. It is efficiently allocate transmission powers and spectrum among CRs known that the problem of maximizing the sum-rate over a according to the surrounding environment. Most previous works multi-access interference channel subject to individual power address this issue via heuristic approaches or using centralized con-aintss anoncnvex optmizt toblemv26]. powe solutions. In this paper, we present a novel joint power/channel constraints is a non-convex optimization problem [26] . Such allocation scheme that uses a distributed pricing strategy to a problem becomes even more complicated when we allow improve the network's performance. In this scheme, the spectrum multiple CRs to share the same channel, as one must now allocation problem is modelled as a non-cooperative game. A consider the CR-to-CR interference in addition to the PR-toprice-based iterative water-filling (PIWF) algorithm is proposed, CR interference.
filling (PIWF) algorithm. We show that this PIWF algorithm update scheme has been used in the literature (e.g., in [2] , [16] , maintains the simplicity and distributed operation of the origi-and [23] ) and is studied in our work for completeness. For the nal IWF algorithm; yet, it achieves better bandwidth efficiency "relaxed" version of the PIWF algorithm, each CR is required in the form of higher sum-rate. The effectiveness of the pricing to remember its most recent policy choices along with the approach depends on the appropriate selection of the "pricing choices of other users. As such, the relaxed update scheme is function", which is a challenging problem by itself. Although more robust to inaccurate estimation and channel oscillations, there may exist an "optimal" pricing function that allows the but it may lead to certain degradation in the convergence NE to converge to the Pareto optimum, the search for such a speed. function generally requires a central controller and is hard to The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system implement in a distributed manner. Some sub-optimal pricing model is described in Section II. Section III formulates the functions have been proposed in the literature. For example, non-cooperative game and introduces the pricing techniques. the authors in [6] proposed an auction-like pricing scheme We discuss the PIWF algorithms and provide some simulation for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) . In this scheme, the results in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section V. unit price (uniform across all users) is gradually increased until the system reaches a feasible NE. A similar approach II. SYSTEM MODEL was used in [22] , where the users of a wireless data network
We consider a hybrid network that consists of several keep increasing their prices in a uniform fashion until one user primary radio networks (PRNs) and one CRN. The CRN begins to receive a decreasing utility. Both of the previously contains N CR pairs (links). The total spectrum consists of mentioned pricing schemes achieve a feasible NE and improve K orthogonal frequency channels (K < N) with central the system performance. However, the achieved NEs are not frequencies fi, f2, ... , fK. Each PR in a PRN may operate guaranteed to be globally optimal, which is partially due to over one or multiple channels. The PRs in the network are the fact that both of the two approaches assume a uniform modelled as an ON/OFF source, where "ON" means that the unit price for all players in the game. In our work, we use a PR user is actively transmitting. user-dependent pricing function, which is shown to improve Each CR may simultaneously transmit over multiple chanthe sum-rate of the achieved NE after a few iterations. Such nels. Similarly, each CR can receive over multiple channels a pricing function can be determined by allowing each CR (from the same transmitter) at the same time. However, we user to distributively explore the neighborhood information require that each CR to operate in a half-duplex manner, via control-packet exchanges.
meaning that it cannot receive while transmitting, and vice Another challenge in applying the classic IWF algorithm versa. When not transmitting, a CR user is also capable of [28] to CRNs is that this algorithm only considers a total measuring the total noise-plus-interference (TNPI) level over power constraint on the transmission of each user. In a CRN, each channel. Let Mi(fk) denote the TNPI level measured by PRs impose a strict power constraint over each frequency CR user i over channel k. This quantity includes the PR-toband, so CR transmissions have to abide by a frequency-CR interference, the CR-to-CR interference, and the thermal dependent power mask. Such a mask affects the response of noise. Let M e d [Mi (fi), lVi (f2) M,lVi (fK)] This vector each CR user and thus the achieved NE. In this paper, we is used by CR i to perform dynamic channel selection, power incorporate a frequency-dependent power mask constraint into control, and rate allocation, as described later. the optimization problem.
Previous work on distributed resource allocation for CRNs In our proposed algorithm, each user maximizes its own (e.g., [25] ) assumed that CR transmissions do not interfere utility function (which includes a pricing term) by perform-with each other, i.e., only one CR link can be active over a ing a single-user price-based water-filling, while treating the given channel in a given neighborhood (along with the PRs).
interference from other CR users at each sub-band as additive In this case, there is no spectrum sharing among CR users.
white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The same procedure iterates Such an approach enjoys simplicity (CSMA/CA-like design) sequentially, eventually converging to the NE. When the but it limits the number of admitted CR links. In our work, number of users in the network is large, sequential updating we allow multiple CR users to share frequency channels. To of transmission powers can suffer from slow convergence. illustrate, Figure 1 gives a channel allocation example for Therefore, we also study a parallel version of the PIWF a CRN with K = 3 and N = 4. A shaded square means algorithm (the parallel concept was first introduced in [24] ). that a channel is utilized by a CR. For example, link 1 uses This parallel algorithm is an instance of the Jacobi scheme: channels 1 and 2, while link 4 uses only channel 1. We At each iteration, CRs update their strategies simultaneously, denote the set of utilized channels for CR link i as Si. In based on the measured interference in the previous iteration. our example, S= {=f, f2} and S4 = {f }. The transmission Simulations indicate that this parallel PIWF algorithm con-power vector of CR link i over various channels is denoted verges faster than the sequential PIWF algorithm.
by Pi [Pi(fi), Pi(f2),.. ,Pi(fK)], where Pi(fk) is the Both the sequential and parallel PIWF algorithms require transmission power of CR i on channel k. If channel k C S~i, CRs to be synchronized and the system parameters to be then Pi (fk£) > 0; otherwise, P (fk) =0.
correctly estimated at each CR. These conditions may not be satisfied in practice. To overcome this problem, a "relaxed" lTruhu this paper, vector quanltities are inadicated inl bold fonat. transmission power of a CR user over the selected the selection of the utility function is not unique, this selection channels should not exceed Pmax, i.e, ZkcS Pi(fk) < must have a physical meaning for the given application. A Pmax. Here, we assume that the total power constraint is natural selection of the utility function for CR link i (also the same for all users. It is easy to extend the treatment used in [7] , [23] , [28] ) is given by:
to the case where Pmax is user-dependent. (k steP-oC interference at the receiver of CR link t over channel k, and
We assume that the CRs are either static or move slowly Ni(fk) is the received thermal noise power on channel k.
(relative to the convergence time of the resource assignment algorithms). In practice, this assumption is generally acceptGiven the above utility function, users iteratively select their able because our iterative algorithms are implemented on the transmission powers to maximize their own utility functions, time scale of few milliseconds, while mobility occurs on the and eventually converge to a NE after several iterations (under time scale of seconds. In addition, we assume that the CRS certain conditions). As discussed before, because of the nonfollow the same operation rules and have the same system cooperative nature of the game, each CR user behaves selfishly.
constraints.
Thus, the resulting NE may be far from the Pareto optimum, defined as:
In a non-cooperative CRN, each CR user is interested in UOPt ,max2wPiNP) maximizing its own achievable rate. Such a greedy behavior N K can be modelled using game theory. Game theory analyzes max 5Wi5Ui(Pi(fk)) (2) players' interactions in decision-making processes. It can be {P1,P2,.,PN} i=1 k=1 used to identify distributed optimal strategies for the players [18] [19] . A normal game can be expressed in the form we re tes th weight assigne tori i, which may 9 {Q, P, {U}}, where Q {1, 2 .,N} is a finite beinterpretedindifferentways(e.g.,priorityfactorofuser i).
set of rational players; P =P x %2 X ... X PN is the To drive the NE towards the above Pareto optimum, we action space with 2, being the action set for player i; and use pricing as an incentive for each CR user. Accordingly, we U,: P -* 'R is the utility (payoff) function of player i, define a new utility function for user i as follows:
which depends on the strategies of all players. We can model K the channel/power allocation problem in a CRN as a nonUi(P) 5 aii(P,(fk)) If there is a solution to the above game, then it is the one Proposition 2: Consider the game 9 with utility function that achieves the NE. Note that the above game differs from Ui, i = 1, 2, ... , N, as defined in (3), and let the pricing the game studied in [28] in the form of the utility function function ci((fk) be given by ci(fk) = Ai(fk)Pi(fk). Then, and in the addition of the power mask constraint. Thus, the the game has at least one NE solution (from Proposition 1). existence proofs in [7] and [28] cannot be directly applied Further, if this NE solution is Pareto optimal, then the pricing here. However, the game in our setup can be easily shown to factor Ai(fk) must be: be a concave game if the following two properties are satisfied: 1
hjj(fk)Pj(fk)hij(fk) 1) The action space P is a closed and bounded convex set; Ai(fk)
2) The utility function Ui(Pi) is concave over its strategy 6NBR,
set.
where NBRi denotes the set of neighbors of user i. problem is a convex problem with the linear constraints C1-C3
Given the existence of a NE solution, we need to design an in (5) . So the Lagrangian function for user i can be written algorithm for CR users to reach this NE. We address this issue as: in the forthcoming sections. However, before we do that, we first discuss the optimal pricing function. Pricing is an idea that originated from economics (e.g., used as an incentive mechanism to improve the efficiency of k the NE (e.g., [22] and [27] ). To illustrate, in Figure 2 , we
depict an example of the Pareto optimal frontier and the NE k k for a two-user game. In general, the NE is not Pareto optimal. where agi,k, /3i, and ai are the Lagrangian multipliers (nonPrevious pricing techniques usually improve the achieved NE negative real numbers). The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-ditions [3] for user i are given by:
By substituting uj(fk) into (9), we have: Intuitively, a higher pricing factor Ai (fk) will prevent user i,k(Pi (fk) -Pmask (fk)) =, Vk i from using a large transmission power on channel k. In view of (6), for link i to determine its optimal pricing factor, the On the other hand, to solve the social optimization problem following procedure is needed: If a neighbor j is to transmit (2) with constraints C1-C3, the Lagrangian function can be over channel k, it needs to broadcast its transmission power written as: Pj (fk), the measured total noise and interference Mj (fk), To obtain the same solution to the two sets of KKT Q is known as the water level. It is determined by user i as conditions (7) and (8), we must have: the minimum non-negative value that results in satisfying the total power constraint C2.
Ai(fk) =-EW ati(i(k (9)
A similar best-response solution to (12) was provided
Wi &gPi(fk)
in [23] . The difference between (12) and the best-response function in [23] is that we have an additional pricing factor Algorithm 1 Sequential PIWF Ai (fk). However, the analysis provided in [23] can be extended Initialize Pi(fk) = 0, Vi and k.
to arrive at the result in Proposition 3. In this paper, we Initialize iteration count I = 0. also provide an alternative proof in the Appendix using the Repeat: sequential optimization technique proposed in [8] . 1: 1 = 1; Note that without the power mask constraint (i.e., 2: for 1 = I to N users do Pmask(fk) = +o0 for all k) and without the pricing function 3: for k = 1 to K channels do (i.e., Ai(fk) = 0 for all k and i), (11) and (12) Water-filling channels
Price-based channels convergence condition was first provided by [28] for the twoWater-filling user case and in [7] for N-user cases. More recently, the convergence conditions were further relaxed in [14] and [23] . Fig. 3 : Classic water-filling versus price-based water-filling.
Because the utility function in (4) includes a pricing term that is not present in the formulations in [14] and [23] , the convergence proofs of [14] and [23] cannot be applied here.
Several approaches can be used by CR users to reach the NE In fact, because the pricing factor Ai(fk) is recomputed in according to the best-response function in (11). CR users may every iteration (as shown in Algorithm 1), the mapping T is make their decisions one after another or in parallel, which time-varying over iterations. Thus the fixed-point theorem that corresponds to a sequential or a parallel update procedure. underlies the proofs in [14] and [23] cannot be applied. The Next, we describe these two procedures and analyze their convergence proof under a time-varying mapping function is a convergence properties.
challenging problem and will be left for future work. However, convergence has always been observed in our simulations.
A. Sequential Price-based Iterative Water Filling Figure 4 depicts the convergence behavior over several In the sequential PIWF algorithm, CR users implement their iterations with N = 10 and K = 5. In the test network, best-response decisions sequentially, according to some given the ten pairs of CRs are randomly placed in a square area of order. Let P(1) be the power vector of user i at Ith iteration. length 400 meters. The power mask vector is set to Pmask llp(l)-P(<-n)ng PIWF algorithm, where E is a small number (e.g., 0.01). If this Figure 4 shows the average sum-rate improvement of the condition is not satisfied within a certain number of iterations sequential PIWF over the classic IWF algorithm for 1000 runs, (Lmax), the algorithm will also stop. The above algorithm is with the starting sum-rate of the IWF algorithm normalized akin to the Gauss-Seidel procedure [15] , where the players to one. The two algorithms converge at comparable speeds, take their turns sequentially and act on the most recent policy but the NE solution for the sequential PIWF algorithm is information obtained from other players. A pseudo-code for much more socially-efficient than the NE of the classic IWF the sequential PIWF algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 1.
algorithm.
In a two-user scenario, the (I + 1)th iteration for user 1 can
Although the convergence proof for a time-varying pricing be expressed as:
function is difficult to establish, if the pricing factor remains P(1 ) =BR1(BR2(P(l)) del T(P') (13) fixed over several iterations, the convergence proof in [23] is still applicable. This is because adding a linear pricing function where T is a vector of functions, given by BR1 (BR2 (.)). For with a fixed pricing factor to the utility function (1) has no a general N-user game, the expression is more complicated, impact on the convergence proof in [23] . If we apply the For simplicity, we keep the notation T as the mapping between analysis in [23] to our CRN formulation in Section III, we the previous power vector and the current power vector. To have the following proposition: ensure convergence to the NE for the IWF algorithm, several for k = 1 to K channels do 7) 1.8 -4:
Estimate the total interference plus noise level 1.6 Ali (fk tn5:
Compute the pricing factor Ai(fk) using (6); 1. 6:
Estimate the channel gain hii(fk) using the received BR,(P1+1)) = BR (BR2(P(l))) T(Pj') may not be satisfied in practice. To overcome this problem, a (16) "relaxed" update scheme can be used (similar to those in [2] , In [23] , it was proved that the convergence conditions for the [16] , and [23] ) and will be discussed here for completeness. parallel and sequential IWF are the same. The same proof is For the "relaxed" version of the PIWF algorithm, each CR is not applicable if the mapping function T(.) is time-varying. required to remember its most recent policy choices together However, if the pricing factor of the linear pricing function with the choices of other users. As such, the relaxed algorithms remains fixed, we can apply the corresponding proof and reach are more robust to occasional estimation errors and channel the following corollary of Proposition 4.
oscillations at the cost of slower convergence speed. Corollary 1: Ifthe conditions in Proposition 4are satisfied, More specifically, we can achieve a "relaxed" version of the parallel update procedure converges to the unique NE of the sequential PIWF algorithm by replacing the best-response solution must be the upper bound Pmassk(fk) itself (a similar approach was also adopted in [8] ). After bounding the Pi* (fk)
by Pmask (fk), the remaining power will be further water-filled function in Algorithm I with: over other channels, thus reaching the result in (I 1). U P1<) aP(71)+
